Column: New Jewish Narrative
What these elections say about Israel
Nov 2, 2026
Q. Last week, on election eve, you speculated on the deeper trends that were emerging. And now that the elections are behind us, any corrections? Additional trends? New directions?
A. The first and most obvious correction to our understanding of the core issues is that polling in Israel is incredibly inaccurate. All the polls missed the outcome. There are lots of theories as to the reasons, including the deliberate use of deceptive polls to affect voting. But we can begin by ruling out polls--even exit polls--as a reliable tool for managing or even understanding Israeli politics.
Secondly--and this point is a derivative of the first--the huge voter turnout by the Arab voters of Israel is arguably not just a surprise that nearly all the polls missed, but a strategic surprise. The new reality of nineteen Arab members of Knesset is obliging everyone to begin conceiving of coalitions and political agendas differently. No longer is it just the Netanyahu bloc versus the Eizenkot-led change bloc. Now there is a definable Arab bloc that cannot and should not be ignored.
Q. What did we learn about leadership?
A. We learned--and will continue to learn in the days and weeks ahead--that Prime Minister Netanyahu, dirty tricks and all--and despite his responsibility for the October 7 massacre and the subsequent mismanaged three-year war--is the smartest politician around. As for opposition leader Eizenkot, we are still learning, but at a minimum we can say that he is anti-charisma and has disappointed as a vote-getter. One Israeli commentator called him “the Israeli version of Kamala Harris”. Nor has any of his fellow opposition leaders emerged in this election as an alternative high-profile vote-getter.
Then too, it is not just Netanyahu’s leadership but, it must be acknowledged, Likud leadership that delivered those 27 MKs. How else to explain the Likud sweep of the northern border periphery and the development town Gaza periphery where Israelis have suffered so heavily in the past three years of Likud-mismanaged war? Notably, it is Netanyahu who engineered Likud election strategies, often by keeping his outgoing Knesset entourage in the shadows in favor of grassroots Likudniks.
Apropos leadership in this election, the virtual collapse of the Shas Sephardic ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) party--down from 11 to six MKs--is being blamed on veteran leader Aryeh Deri, a major figure whose political career may now be over. It appears that Deri failed to maneuver through the contradiction generated by Ashkenazi-led Haredi refusal to serve in the IDF at a time of national need on the one hand, and the natural inclination of at least some Shas supporters to, indeed, do national service on the other.
This contradiction is particularly poignant now that it emerges that Eizenkot, in his best-case scenario for forming a coalition, will need to poach some Haredim away from Likud’s coalition bloc and, to make that option attractive, back off from threatening that they do military service or face huge budgetary-financial penalties. So much for that election promise.
Yossi Alpher's Death Tango: Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat and Three Fateful Days in March
"Anyone seeking to understand how Israelis and Palestinians traded the hopes of Oslo for something approaching hopelessness is well-advised to read this book. With penetrating analysis and elegant prose, Yossi Alpher has told the gripping story of three days nearly two decades ago that continue to haunt would-be peacemakers. Yossi’s faithful readers will not be disappointed with his latest effort."
Ambassador Frederic C. Hof, Bard College
"A riveting account of the crucial days in March 2002 when the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was profoundly changed for the worse. The peace camp has never recovered from those wrenching days, and we live now without any hope of a just settlement. Alpher is a highly respected expert who has spent decades studying this conflict from both sides."
Bruce Riedel, Director of the Brookings Intelligence Project
"A critical assessment of a key period in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict never before presented in such detail. The best and most capable players at the executive and political levels proved unable to forge any resolution, final or partial, because both parties continued to maintain an insurmountable gulf between themselves. This is a MUST read for anyone daring to tackle the future of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and of Israel-Arab relations in general."
Efraim Halevy, former Head of the Mossad (1998-2002)
Oraib Khader and Avi Bar-On are youngish Palestinian and Israeli bachelors with security experience, readiness to do business with one another, a shared fondness for women and money, and total cynicism about the lack of peace between their two peoples.
Oraib and Avi can never become true friends: the cultural and political gaps are too wide. But as they confront a failed peace process and a bleak peace future, they readily become business partners: shady business that exploits a lot of naïve international peace aspirations.
As Oraib sums up on a visit to Sarpsborg, Norway, where the ultimately-failed Oslo peace talks were held, “There is a lesson here for those who still doggedly and hopelessly pursue a two-state solution in the Middle East. Get smart. Get out of the Israeli-Palestinian peace business. Step back and let the Jews and Arabs screw one another while making money.”